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The current paper introduces a novel feature of Implicit Association Tests (IATs) by 
demonstrating their potential to change implicit attitudes. We assume that such changes are 
driven by associative learning mechanisms caused by carrying out an IAT task. Currently, 
evaluative conditioning appears to be the only widespread paradigm for changing implicit 
attitudes. An IAT task could provide an alternative. In two experiments, participants initially 
reacted to only one IAT task. Implicit preferences subsequently assessed with different 
implicit measures depended on the initial IAT task. This was shown for implicit self-esteem 
and for attitudes towards well-known candy brands. Findings are discussed in relation to task-
order effects in IATs.   
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How to Like Yourself Better, or Chocolate Less:  
Changing Implicit Attitudes with One IAT Task 
Virtually all objects are liked or disliked. Researchers have undertaken enormous 
efforts not only to measure attitudes towards objects, social groups, and the self, but also to 
detect means of changing them (e.g., Chaiken, Wood, & Eagly, 1996; Eagly & Chaiken, 
1993; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953; McGuire, 1968; Petty & 
Wegener, 1998). Appropriate methods of attitude change are of interest due to their wide-
ranging applicability to fields such as advertising, anti-discrimination programs, clinical 
interventions, or election campaigns, to name just a few. Major strategies of attitude change 
affect either deliberate, rule-based processes assigned to a reflective system, or basic 
associative structures of an impulsive system that depends on basic learning processes (e.g., 
Strack & Deutsch, 2004). More concretely, links are created or strengthened if stimuli are 
presented or activated in close temporal or spatial proximity. These conditions are present in 
one main attitude measure, Implicit Association Tests (IATs, Greenwald, McGhee, & 
Schwartz, 1998). We thus test whether IATs change attitudes while measuring them, in 
analogy to Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, and we demonstrate attitude change with 
regard to self attitudes and consumer attitudes.  
Implicit attitudesi have been referred to as evaluations that are triggered automatically 
by the mere presence of the attitude object, often without a person’s awareness and control 
(e.g., Bargh, 1994; Devine, 2001; Rydell, McConnell, Mackie, & Strain, 2006). Whereas 
previous models conceptualized implicit and explicit attitudes as a dichotomy (Wilson, 
Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000), the Iterative Reprocessing model (Cunningham & Zelazo, 2007) 
assumes that evaluative processing occurs on a continuum from relatively automatic to 
relatively reflective processing. Thus, changing implicit attitudes should affect attitudes in 
general (also see Petty, Tormala, Brinol, & Jarvis, 2006).  
The paradigm typically used for changing implicit attitudes is evaluative conditioning 
(EC, for a review, see De Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001). During EC a neutral stimulus 
is paired with an affective stimulus. This leads to a change in valence of the formerly neutral 
stimulus according to the valence of the affective stimulus. Analogical to the learning 
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mechanism of Pavlovian conditioning (PC), the formerly neutral stimulus (NS) is equivalent 
to the conditioned stimulus (CS), whereas the affective stimulus corresponds to the 
unconditioned stimulus (US, De Houwer et al., 2001). However, other than in PC where 
signal or expectancy learning takes place, EC is described as the learning of likes and dislikes, 
that is, as the acquisition of preferences (Walther, 2002), and it is assumed to be a distinct 
form of learning (Baeyens & De Houwer, 1995; Baeyens, Eelen, & Crombez, 1995; Baeyens, 
Eelen, Crombez, & Van den Bergh, 1992). The major characteristics distinguishing EC from 
PC illustrate the suitability of EC from an application perspective, for instance, in consumer 
research. First, the findings that EC does not depend on CS-US contingency awareness and 
that mere spatio-temporal CS-US co-occurrences (i.e., contiguity) are sufficient to provoke 
EC imply that it does not require full attention. Second, it is desirable that the learned 
association of a product and a positively valenced cue persist even when subsequently 
encountering the product in the absence of the appetitive US, as it is often the case in real-
word settings (for research on the application of EC to advertisement, see Walther, Ebert, & 
Meinerling, 2009). Changes in implicit attitudes based on associative learning have been 
demonstrated in several studies (e.g., Baccus, Baldwin, & Packer, 2004; e.g., Dijksterhuis, 
2004; Gibson, 2008; Hermans, Vansteenwegen, Crombez, Baeyens, & Eelen, 2002; Karpinski 
& Hilton, 2001; Mitchell, Anderson, & Lovibond, 2003; Olson & Fazio, 2001; Rydell et al., 
2006). For example, Dijksterhuis (2004) increased participants’ implicit self-esteem through 
subliminal EC. 
When assessing implicit attitudes in those and hundreds of other studies, IATs are 
often used (Greenwald et al., 1998; for a review see Lane, Banaji, Nosek, & Greenwald, 
2007). In addition, millions of people from more than 30 nations have taken IATs on various 
internet sites (e.g. https://implicit.harvard.edu). In each combined task of an attitude IAT, 
pairs of attitude objects and affective concepts (e.g., self and positive on the left vs. others and 
negative on the right, henceforth, the self+/others– task) are presented on the computer screen, 
along with associated stimuli (me, bad, etc.) that are to be classified fast using a left versus 
right response key. Reaction times in the self+/others– task (congruent task) are compared to 
those in a reversed task (where others and positive are on the left vs. self and negative on the 
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right, henceforth, the others+/self– or incongruent task). The reaction time difference between 
tasks, the IAT effect, is taken as an indicator of implicit attitudes.  
We raise the hypothesis that associative learning takes place during each IAT task. 
Whereas procedurally, the EC paradigm differs fundamentally from an IAT task, the common 
component could be that both cases involve associative learning based on the spatio-temporal 
contiguity of an attitude object and an affective stimulus. More concretely, during each IAT 
task mental representations of target-plus-attribute compound concepts (e.g., self+) are 
activated (for similar accounts see De Houwer, 2003; Steffens et al., 2004). This should result 
in associative learning, thus eventually leading to changes in the underlying attitudes. 
If our assumption is correct that performing an IAT task changes attitudes, this does 
not only provide a conceptual replication of implicit attitude change with a paradigm different 
from EC, allowing for more general conclusions; but numerous applications are also 
conceivable. An obvious advantage of an IAT task is that the contingencies involved are easy 
to implement: using a paper-and-pencil task (cf. Karpinski & Hilton, 2001) on a daily basis to 
increase implicit self-esteem would require no technical support. In the following, we 
investigated whether performing an IAT task changes attitudes and whether behavioral 
consequences can be observed.  
Prestudies 1-3 
Participants initially reacted to only one (combined) IAT task. We predicted that this 
would lead to a relative implicit preference for the concept paired with positive versus 
negative. As concepts characterized by weak a priori attitudes are more susceptible to 
conditioning (e.g., Cacioppo, Marshall Goodell, Tassinary, & Petty, 1992), we used letters of 
the alphabet (I vs. O) and names of unknown social groups (Luupites vs. Niffites) as attitude 
objects (Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006; Nuttin, 1985, 1987). Each participant performed one 
IAT task. For instance, we manipulated whether this was an I+/O– or an O+/I– task. In each 
case, different implicit measures administered subsequently showed a significantly more 
positive implicit attitude towards the concept initially paired with positive compared to 
negative, showing that reacting to one IAT task changed implicit attitudes.  
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In order to test whether reacting to one IAT task also changes established implicit 
attitudes, we investigated self-esteem.  
Participants 
In exchange for candy, 59 students of a large German university participated, 61% of 
them female (age: 18 to 46 years, M = 22, SD = 3). Given N = 59 and α = .05, a large effect of 
the between-subjects factor initial IAT task (f = .40) could be detected with a statistical power 
of .86 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). 
Materials & Procedure 
Participants were led to separate experimental cubicles. All instructions were 
presented on iBooks. Participants were randomly assigned to type of IAT task (self+/others– 
or others+/self–) that consisted of 3 blocks comprising 42 trials each. More concretely, target 
concepts were I (German: ich) versus others (German: andere), corresponding stimuli: I, me, 
self, versus others, you, those. Attribute concepts were positive versus negative,  
corresponding stimuli: positive, good, pleasant, versus negative, bad, unpleasant (cf. Steffens, 
Kirschbaum, & Glados, 2008). Two response keys on the keyboard were marked with colored 
dots. The cover story was that a very difficult task would follow, so participants were to 
practice reacting accurately and quickly. Accordingly, the computer program was visibly 
named “Practice trials.” The IAT task was identical to one combined task. The reaction-
stimulus interval was 200 ms. Feedback on reaction times and errors was provided after each 
block. After informing participants they had practiced enough, implicit attitudes were 
measured with different implicit measures: first with a response window priming task (RWP, 
Draine & Greenwald, 1998), then with two GNATs (Nosek & Banaji, 2001).  
The RWP consisted of 3 blocks of 40 trials each. The primes were I versus Others. In 
order to show generalizability, we used different target stimuli (warm, loveable, attractive, 
versus useless, repellent, inferior). The RWP procedure followed that described by Musch 
(2000). Participants were instructed to react only to the attributes presented and to “ignore 
anything that may flash on the screen” before an attribute appeared (i.e., the primes). Attribute 
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targets as well as primes were displayed in randomized order. Participants’ task was judging 
under time pressure (i.e., within a short response window) if the attribute target presented was 
positive or negative. The prime (e.g., I) was presented for 60 ms and there was a 10-ms 
interval between prime and target (e.g, loveable). After participants had reacted, the target 
remained on the screen for 500 ms. There was a 1 s interval between trials (see Steffens et al., 
2008, for further details). The labels positive and negative were presented in the upper left 
and right corners of the screen, respectively. Notably, in the initial IAT task, we 
counterbalanced whether positive was assigned to the left versus right key. Otherwise, the 
priming effect could have been based on the priming stimuli priming “positive”, “left”, or 
both. In other words, our design allowed to distinguish an association between self and 
valence from an association between self and key side (cf. De Houwer, 2003). The RWP 
effect is based on error differences. A more positive attitude towards the self than towards 
others is inferred from higher error rates when responding to negative after self than others as 
prime, plus higher error rates when responding to positive after others than self as prime. 
In the subsequent GNATs, one assessing implicit attitudes towards self, the other, 
towards others, the same stimuli were used. For example, participants were asked to react in 
one task to self and positive stimuli (“go trials”) and ignore negative stimuli (“no-go trials”), 
in the other task, they reacted to self and negative, ignoring positive stimuli. Only 3 categories 
were used, and two thirds of the trials were go-trials. Each GNAT comprised two blocks of 42 
trials. Each stimulus belonging to one of the two categories on the top of the screen required 
pressing the space bar. Response deadline was 1000 ms, reaction times were measured, and 
the response-stimulus interval was 200 ms. The GNAT effect was computed as the mean 
reaction-time difference between the two tasks. Order of the two GNATs as well as task order 
within the GNATs were held constant (Others+, Others–, I–, and I+). Before participants were 
thanked and debriefed, explicit attitudes were collected as additional DVs, but findings are 
not reported because no effects were found in any experiment. 
Design 
The design was a 2×2, with type of IAT task (I+/Others– vs. Others+/I–) and key 
assignment during IAT task (positive on the left vs. right) as between-subjects variables. 
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Dependent variables were RWP effect and GNAT effects.  
Results & Discussion 
All analyses were conducted with α = .05. As one would expect, participants became 
significantly faster across blocks of the initial IAT task, F(2, 57) = 16.47, η²p = .37 (Ms = 882 
and 722 ms in Blocks 1 and 3, respectively).  
RWP. Figure 1 shows that participants in the I+/Others– condition displayed a larger 
preference for self than those in the Others+/I– condition, yielding a main effect of IAT task 
in the 2×2 ANOVA, F(1, 55) = 4.52, η²p = .08. Not surprisingly, there was also an overall 
preference for self over others, F(1, 55) = 4.69, η²p = .08. We also observed a significant 
interaction of type of IAT task and key side, F(1, 55) = 4.00, η²p = .07, caused by a larger 
effect of type of IAT task when key side matched during priming and preceding IAT task 
(other F < 2). 
GNATs. Positive GNAT effects indicate a positive attitude towards self (GNAT I) and 
others (GNAT Others), respectively (see Figure 2). Participants who had reacted to 
I+/Others– showed a more positive attitude towards I and a more negative attitude towards 
Others than those who had reacted to Others+/I–. The 2×2 ANOVA revealed the expected 
interaction between GNAT effect and type of IAT task, F(1, 53) = 5.32, η²p = .09. I was 
evaluated more positively after reacting to I+/Others– than Others+/I– (simple main effect: 
F(1, 53) = 4.76, η²p = .08), and Others was evaluated more positively after reacting to 
Others+/I– than I+/Others– (simple main effect: F(1, 53) = 2.60, η²p = .05). Again, there was 
an overall preference for self over others (F(1, 53) = 29.50, η²p = .36).  
In sum, using the concepts I versus Others, Experiment 1 demonstrated changes in 
well-established implicit attitudes caused by performing one IAT task: two implicit measures 
revealed higher implicit self-esteem for participants who had responded to I and positive 
versus Others and negative compared to those in the reversed condition. With regard to 
priming, we observed an interaction of type of IAT task and key side of attribute concepts 
during IAT task, indicating that next to a learning process affecting the underlying evaluative 
associations, a further learning process established associations between attitude object and 
response.  
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Experiment 2 aimed at replicating the findings, drawing on different attitude objects 
with well-established a priori evaluative associations, namely the two candy brands Milka (a 
chocolate manufacturer) and Haribo (a producer of gummy bears) that are among the most 
famous and popular candy brands in Germany. This allowed testing whether the hypothesized 
attitude change results in immediate behavior change.  
Participants & Design 
In exchange for candy, 83 students of a large German university participated, 89% of 
them female (age: 18 to 33 years, M = 22, SD = 2). The design was identical to Experiment 1.  
Materials & Procedure 
Except for the stimulus material all was identical to Experiment 1. Target concepts in 
the initial IAT task were Milka versus Haribo, corresponding stimuli: Milka, chocolate, and a 
colloquial expression (“Schoko”) versus Haribo, gummy bears, and a synonym (“Goldbär”). 
The attribute dimension remained positive, negative. RWP primes were Milka, Haribo, the 
targets, delicious, tasty, delicate, versus disgusting, nasty, loathsome. GNATs used the same 
stimuli as priming. Order of GNATs and task order were constant (Haribo+, Haribo–, Milka–, 
and Milka+). After the study participants chose between chocolate and gummy bears for 
compensation to explore effects on behavior.  
Results & Discussion 
Again, reactions became significantly faster across blocks of initial IAT task, F(2, 81) 
= 76.47, η²p = .65 (Block 1: M = 843 ms, Block 3: M = 659 ms).  
RWP. Participants in the Milka+/Haribo– condition displayed a larger preference for 
Milka than those in the Haribo+/Milka– condition (Figure 1), reflected in a main effect of 
type of IAT task, F(1, 79) = 4.16, η²p = .05. Again, there was an interaction of type of IAT 
task and key side, F(1, 79) = 4.07, η²p = .05 (other F < 1), due to a larger effect of type of IAT 
task when key side of the evaluative concepts matched during priming and IAT task. 
GNATs. Participants who had reacted to Milka+/Haribo– showed a more positive 
attitude towards Milka and a more negative attitude towards Haribo than those who had 
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reacted to Haribo+/Milka– (Figure 2). This interaction was corroborated, F(1, 71) = 10.31, η²p 
= 13. Whereas Milka was evaluated more positively in the Milka+/Haribo– compared to the 
reversed condition (simple main effect: F(1, 71) = 4.32, η²p = .06), Haribo was evaluated 
more positively in the Haribo+/Milka– condition (simple main effect: F(1, 71) = 8.83, η²p = 
.11).  
Choice. Type of IAT task had no direct effect on candy choice, with only 42% of the 
participants in the Milka+ condition choosing Milka, as compared to 51% in the Haribo+ 
condition. In a logistic regression analysis, in Step 1, the implicit preference for Milka over 
Haribo as measured with the averaged GNAT effects predicted choosing chocolate over 
gummy bears, Wald χ2(1)= 4.33; Nagelkerke’s R2 = .09; 55% of cases were correctly 
classified.ii In Step 2, with IAT task added, correct classifications increased to 62%, 
Nagelkerke`s R2 = .15. Implicit preference for Milka over Haribo predicted choice behavior, 
Wald χ2(1)= 6.24, and IAT task missed the preset criterion of statistical significance, Wald 
χ2(1)= 3.27 (p = .07). Apparently, including IAT task improved prediction because choice was 
more closely associated with the residual variance in the GNAT after partialling out IAT task.  
In sum, using popular candy brands, the implicit measures consistently revealed 
preferences in line with the preceding IAT task. Participants in the Milka+/Haribo– condition 
showed a more positive implicit attitude towards Milka than those in the Haribo+/Milka– 
condition, and vice versa for attitudes towards Haribo. With respect to priming we again 
obtained an interaction between type of IAT task and key side, implying that two learning 
processes take place during an IAT task: in addition to category-valence associations, 
category-response associations are learned.  
General Discussion 
We showed that as a consequence of performing one IAT task (e.g., pairing self with 
positive and others with negative), implicit attitudes were altered, as indicated by two other 
implicit attitude measures. Replicating previous findings on implicit self-esteem and 
consumer attitudes, we thus showed that well-established attitudes can be altered through 
associative learning. In analogy to evaluative conditioning (EC), the target concepts in 
attitude IATs might act as conditioned stimuli and the attribute concepts as unconditioned 
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stimuli. Whereas the paradigms of EC and an IAT task are undoubtedly different, their 
commonality seems to be that attitude change based on the spatio-temporal contiguity of a 
valenced stimulus and an attitude object takes place. Direct comparisons of both learning 
mechanisms are needed to test which of them changes implicit attitudes more effectively 
under what circumstances. Numerous real-world settings (e.g., clinical and educational ones) 
are conceivable where IAT tasks could be easily and meaningfully implemented. Moreover, 
the present findings add to the growing body of research showing that implicit attitudes need 
not be remnants of the distant past, for example, internalized childhood attitudes (Wilson, et 
al., 2000), but can, instead, be changed quickly.  
Implications for IATs. The change in implicit attitudes we observed yields a new look 
on task-order effects in IATs, the frequent finding that larger IAT effects are obtained when 
the attitude-congruent task is performed first. Nosek, Greenwald and Banaji (2005) showed 
that task-order effects are reduced by an extended practice IAT task between the IAT tasks 
where participants react to the target concepts in the reversed way. Klauer and Mierke (2005) 
explained such findings as aftereffects of task-switching. They assumed that correct 
responding during the incongruent IAT task requires suppressing the attribute task set (i.e., 
evaluation). After having started with the incongruent task, this inhibition persists, thus 
leading to a slowdown in reactions in the congruent task and to smaller IAT effects. With the 
congruent task performed first, the attribute task set is activated. Subsequently suppressing the 
attribute task set is effortful, so reactions slow down in the incongruent task, increasing the 
IAT effect. With extended reversed practice between combined tasks, as shown by Nosek and 
colleagues, the aftereffects of the first task eventually fade.  
Based on the present findings, we suggest an account of task-order effects in IATs that 
is not based on inhibition, but on implicit-attitude change. In order to explain the learning 
advantage of the first task, we draw on proactive interference: learning of new information is 
impaired by the former learning of similar but different information (Schneider & Shiffrin, 
1977; Underwood, 1957). This is in line with recent findings in decision-making research 
(Betsch, Haberstroh, Glöckner, Haar, & Fiedler, 2001; Betsch, Haberstroh, Molter, & 
Glöckner, 2004): it takes longer to change previously learned associations (routines) than to 
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learn new associations. Similarly, during an IAT task associative learning may take place. 
Concretely, when starting with the congruent task, time costs due to changing associations 
increase the reaction times in the subsequent, incongruent task (that are inherently larger), 
thus leading to larger IAT effects. When starting with the incongruent task, increases in 
reaction times due to changing associations are at the cost of the congruent task, resulting in 
smaller IAT effects. This explanation of task-order effects is in line with the proposal by 
Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji  (2003) that task-order effects result from negative transfer 
(e.g., Woodworth & Schlosberg, 1954), where practice at one task interferes with 
performance at another.  
Previous researchers have highlighted that attitudes towards the concept first paired 
with positive appear more positive. The present findings imply that these attitudes instead are 
more positive. Some of the association learning taking place should be offset by the 
subsequent task when a complete IAT is administered, but this learning of different 
associations will not completely wipe out initial learning (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; 
Underwood, 1957). With respect to other implicit attitude measures, it could be that those 
comprising a block structure are susceptible to changing implicit attitudes, whereas those 
measuring attitudes on a trial-by-trial basis are not.  
Klauer and Mierke (2005) suggested that task-order effects in IATs are based on the 
suppression of evaluations during the incongruent task. Strongest suppression effects should 
be expected in the presence of strong evaluations. Our prestudies used stimuli characterized 
by weak a priori evaluations (e.g., Niffite). It is thus unlikely that our findings are best 
explained with suppression effects. However, we believe that Klauer and Mierke’s findings 
cannot distinguish between reduced accessibility after an incongruent IAT task (their 
preferred explanation) and increased accessibility after a congruent IAT task. From that 
perspective, the process we postulate is quite similar to what they describe as “an effect on the 
accessibility of the attribute information” (p. 216).  
We believe that the difference between an accessibility account of task-order effects in 
IATs and an attitude change account is gradual rather than categorical. According to the APE 
model (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006), implicit attitudes, referred to as associative 
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evaluations, change either by (a) an incremental change in the associative structure or (b) a 
temporal change in pattern activation. Whereas the first case implies the learning of a new 
evaluation, the latter refers to the differential activation of evaluations stored in associative 
memory. An accessibility account suggests a short-term change that eventually fades (even if 
it may last at least 24 hours, see Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001). An attitude change account 
suggests that some long-term change remains, even if that change is too small to be detected. 
Obviously, these options are hard to distinguish empirically. Future research should determine 
the longevity of IAT-induced attitude changes. 
Implications for Attitude Change. The present findings are related not only to those on 
EC, but also to implicit learning. New associations are learned during a study phase that later 
influence the fluency with which stimuli are processed (e.g., Buchner, Steffens, Erdfelder, & 
Rothkegel, 1997), and that may influence reactions to new social stimuli, such as faces with 
certain characteristics (c.f. Czyzewska, 2001, for a review; also see Kawakami, Phills, Steele, 
& Dovidio, 2007; Kawakami, Steele, Cifa, Phills, & Dovidio, 2008, for an approach to 
change stereotypes by associative learning). It is possible that operant conditioning is a 
learning mechanism underlying the observed effects in implicit learning or IAT tasks. 
Organisms appear to have a fundamental desire for efficient behavior control (Hoffmann, 
1993), which can be obtained by reacting fast and correct during a task. Thus, reacting fast 
could act as a reinforcer. If the effects on implicit attitudes we have observed are based on 
such a general learning mechanism, they will generalize to different attribute concepts. It is an 
open question whether equivalent effects can be observed in stereotype IATs, namely the 
learning of semantic associations, or whether half an IAT changes implicit attitudes, but not 
stereotypes.  
In contrast to the strong effects on implicit attitudes, we observed only small effects of 
concept-valence pairings on explicit measures or choice behavior. Clearly, in the presence of 
strong a priori attitudes (e.g., loving chocolate), a binary choice reveals attitude change 
imperfectly. However, predicting choice behavior from implicit attitudes was improved when 
IAT task was taken into account, suggesting that the variance in the implicit measure 
associated with choice differs from the variance explained by IAT task. Such a pattern of 
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implicit attitude change with little effect on explicit attitude and behavior can be explained 
with the APE model (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). Put shortly, when people notice the 
pairing of concepts with good and bad in the initial task, the evaluation that a given concept 
subsequently triggers is discounted as irrelevant and thus does not influence deliberate 
behavior. Accordingly, a delay between attitude induction and attitude measurement may 
provoke change in explicit attitudes, and different circumstances may reveal a stronger impact 
on behavior—deliberate choices do not directly reflect implicit preferences; for instance, 
dietary restraints counteract candy preferences (cf. Spruyt, Hermans, De Houwer, 
Vandekerckhove, & Eelen, 2007). A stronger relationship between implicit attitudes and 
deliberate choices should be found when cognitive capacity is reduced and a-priori 
preferences are weak (Friese, Hofmann, & Wänke, 2008; Gibson, 2008). Moreover, based on 
general principles of learning, we speculate that stronger, and long-lasting, IAT-induced 
attitude change occurs after repeated exposure to the same IAT task, spread over longer time 
intervals (cf. Baddeley, 1997). Whereas we believe that such IAT-based interventions can be 
used to target undesirable and/or maladaptive behaviors, given the relative transparency of the 
procedure (Steffens, 2004), they probably work best when no reactance is expected, that is, 
when participants themselves desire to change their attitudes and behavior.  
In a nutshell, we have learned from the present research that performing one IAT task 
is a form of associative learning that changes implicit attitudes even towards established 
concepts, such as the self or mature brands. This finding is crucial with regard to real-life 
applications. It also allows to generalize findings on implicit attitude change beyond one 
specific paradigm (EC). Furthermore, our prestudies extend the scope of IAT tasks to attitude 
formation. What we hope future research to show is under what conditions this form of 
associative learning is more powerful or more easily applicable than known associative-
learning paradigms; how many trials are needed to trigger learning; and how number of trials 
and learning intervals relate to the longevity of learning effects. Of further interest is the 
question whether IAT-induced learning extends to the learning of semantic associations and 
under what conditions it influences explicit attitudes and behavior.  
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 





Baccus, J. R., Baldwin, M. W., & Packer, D. J. (2004). Increasing implicit self-esteem 
through classical conditioning. Psychological Science, 15, 498-502. 
Baddeley, A. D. (1997). Human memory: Theory and practice. Hillsdale, NJ, USA: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, Inc.  
Baeyens, F., & De Houwer, J. (1995). Evaluative conditioning is a qualitatively distinct form 
of classical conditioning: A reply to Davey (1994). Behaviour Research and Therapy, 
33, 825-831. 
Baeyens, F., Eelen, P., & Crombez, G. (1995). Pavlovian associations are forever: On 
classical conditioning and extinction. Journal of Psychophysiology, 9, 127-141. 
Baeyens, F., Eelen, P., Crombez, G., & Van den Bergh, O. (1992). Human evaluative 
conditioning: Acquisition trials, presentation schedule, evaluative style and 
contingency awareness. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 30, 133-142. 
Bargh, J. A. (1994). The four horsemen of automaticity: Awareness, intention, efficiency, and 
control in social cognition. In R. S. Wyer, Jr. & T. K. Srull (Eds.), Handbook of social 
cognition (2nd ed.). (pp. 1-40). Hillsdale, NJ, England: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 
Inc. 
Betsch, T., Haberstroh, S., Glöckner, A., Haar, T., & Fiedler, K. (2001). The effects of routine 
strength on adaptation and information search in recurrent decision making. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 84, 23-53. 
Betsch, T., Haberstroh, S., Molter, B., & Glöckner, A. (2004). Oops, I did it again--relapse 
errors in routinized decision making. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 93, 62-74. 
Blair, I. V. (2002). The malleability of automatic stereotypes and prejudice. Personality and 
Social Psychology Review, 6, 242-261. 
Buchner, A., Steffens, M. C., Erdfelder, E., & Rothkegel, R. (1997). A multinomial model to 
assess fluency and recollection in a sequence learning task. The Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 50A, 631-663. 
Cacioppo, J. T., Marshall Goodell, B. S., Tassinary, L. G., & Petty, R. E. (1992). 
Rudimentary determinants of attitudes: Classical conditioning is more effective when 
prior knowledge about the attitude stimulus is low than high. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 28, 207-233. 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 Changing Implicit Attitudes with an IAT Task   
 
16 
Chaiken, S., Wood, W., & Eagly, A. H. (1996). Principles of persuasion. In E. T. Higgins & 
A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles. (pp. 702-
742). New York, NY: Guilford Press. 
Cunningham, W. A., & Zelazo, P. D. (2007). Attitudes and evaluations: A social cognitive 
neuroscience perspective. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11, 97-104. 
Czyzewska, M. A. (2001). Implicit learning: Theoretical and methodological controversies 
Polish Psychological Bulletin, 32, 45-52. 
Dasgupta, N., & Greenwald, A. G. (2001). On the malleability of automatic attitudes: 
Combating automatic prejudice with images of admired and disliked individuals. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 800-814. 
De Houwer, J. (2003). A structural analysis of indirect measures of attitudes. In J. Musch & 
K. C. Klauer (Eds.), The psychology of evaluation: Affective processes in cognition 
and emotion (pp. 219-244). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
De Houwer, J., Thomas, S., & Baeyens, F. (2001). Association learning of likes and dislikes: 
A review of 25 years of research on human evaluative conditioning. Psychological 
Bulletin, 127, 853-869. 
Devine, P. G. (2001). Implicit prejudice and stereotyping: How automatic are they? 
Introduction to the special section. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 
757-759. 
Dijksterhuis, A. (2004). I like myself but I don't know why: Enhancing implicit self-esteem 
by subliminal evaluative conditioning. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
86, 345-355. 
Draine, S. C., & Greenwald, A. G. (1998). Replicable unconscious semantic priming. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: General, 127, 286-303. 
Eagly, A. H., & Chaiken, S. (1993). The psychology of attitudes. Fort Worth, TX: : Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich College Publishers. 
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Lang, A.-G., & Buchner, A. (2007). G*Power 3: A flexible statistical 
power analysis program for the social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences. Behavior 
Research Methods, 39, 175-191. 
Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. (1975). Belief, attitude, intention, and behavior: An introduction to 
theory and research. Reading, MA, USA: Addison-Wesley. 
Friese, M., Hofmann, W., & Wänke, M. (2008). When impulses take over: Moderated 
predictive validity of explicit and implicit attitude measures in predicting food choice 
and consumption behaviour. British Journal of Social Psychology, 47, 397-419. 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 Changing Implicit Attitudes with an IAT Task   
 
17 
Gawronski, B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2006). Associative and propositional processes in 
evaluation: An integrative review of implicit and explicit attitude change. 
Psychological Bulletin, 132, 692-731. 
Gibson, B. (2008). Can evaluative conditioning change attitudes toward mature brands? New 
evidence from the Implicit Association Test. Journal of Consumer Research, 35, 178-
188. 
Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. K. (1998). Measuring individual 
differences in implicit cognition: The implicit association test. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 74, 1464-1480. 
Greenwald, A. G., Nosek, B. A., & Banaji, M. R. (2003). Understanding and using the 
Implicit Association Test: I. An improved scoring algorithm. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 85, 197-216. 
Gregg, A. P., Seibt, B., & Banaji, M. R. (2006). Easier done than undone: Asymmetry in the 
malleability of implicit preferences. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90, 
1-20. 
Hermans, D., Vansteenwegen, D., Crombez, G., Baeyens, F., & Eelen, P. (2002). Expectancy-
learning and evaluative learning in human classical conditioning: Affective priming as 
an indirect and unobtrusive measure of conditioned stimulus valence. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 40, 217-234. 
Hoffmann, J. (1993). Unbewußtes Lernen – eine besondere Lernform? Psychologische 
Rundschau, 44, 75-89. 
Hovland, C. I., Janis, I. L., & Kelley, H. H. (1953). Communication and persuasion. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Karpinski, A., & Hilton, J. L. (2001). Attitudes and the Implicit Association Test. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 774-788. 
Kawakami, K., Phills, C. E., Steele, J. R., & Dovidio, J. F. (2007). (Close) distance makes the 
heart grow fonder: Improving implicit racial attitudes and interracial interactions 
through approach behaviors. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92, 957-
971. 
Kawakami, K., Steele, J. R., Cifa, C., Phills, C. E., & Dovidio, J. F. (2008). Approaching 
math increases math=me and math=pleasant. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 44, 818-825. 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 Changing Implicit Attitudes with an IAT Task   
 
18 
Klauer, K. C., & Mierke, J. (2005). Task-Set inertia, attitude accessibility, and compatibility-
order effects: New evidence for a task-set switching account of the Implicit 
Association Test effect. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 208-217. 
Lane, K. A., Banaji, M. R., Nosek, B. A., & Greenwald, A. G. (2007). Understanding and 
using the Implicit Association Test: IV. What we know (so far) about the method. In 
B. Wittenbrink & N. Schwarz (Eds.), Implicit measures of attitudes (pp. 59-102). New 
York: Guilford. 
McGuire, W. J. (1968). The nature of attitudes and attitude change. In G. L. E. & Aronson 
(Eds.), The handbook of social psychology (2 ed., Vol. 3, pp. 136-314). Reading, MA: 
Addison-Wesley. 
Mitchell, C. J., Anderson, N. E., & Lovibond, P. F. (2003). Measuring evaluative 
conditioning using the Implicit Association Test. Learning and Motivation, 34, 203-
217. 
Musch, J. (2000). Affektives Priming: Kongruenzeffekte bei der evaluativen Bewertung 
(Affective priming: Congruency effects in evaluative judgment). Unpublished 
Doctoral dissertation. Universität Bonn. 
Nosek, B. A., & Banaji, M. R. (2001). The Go/No-go Association Task. Social Cognition, 19, 
625-666. 
Nosek, B. A., Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (2005). Understanding and using the 
Implicit Association Test: II. Method variables and construct validity. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 166-180. 
Nuttin, J. M. (1985). Narcissism beyond Gestalt and awareness: The name letter effect. 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 15, 353-361. 
Nuttin, J. M. (1987). Affective consequences of mere ownership: The name letter effect in 
twelve European languages. European Journal of Social Psychology, 17, 381-402. 
Olson, M. A., & Fazio, R. H. (2001). Implicit attitude formation through classical 
conditioning. Psychological Science, 12, 413-417. 
Petty, R. E., Tormala, Z. L., Brinol, P., & Jarvis, W. B. G. (2006). Implicit ambivalence from 
attitude change: An exploration of the PAST model. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 90, 21-41. 
Petty, R. E., & Wegener, D. T. (1998). Matching versus mismatching attitude functions: 
Implications for scrutiny of persuasive messages. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 24, 227-204. 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 Changing Implicit Attitudes with an IAT Task   
 
19 
Rydell, R. J., McConnell, A. R., Mackie, D. M., & Strain, L. M. (2006). Of two minds: 
Forming and changing valence-inconsistent implicit and explicit attitudes. 
Psychological Science, 17, 954-958. 
Schneider, W., & Shiffrin, R. M. (1977). Controlled and automatic human information 
processing: I. Detection, search, and attention. Psychological Review, 84, 1-66. 
Spruyt, A., Hermans, D., De Houwer, J., Vandekerckhove, J., & Eelen, P. (2007). On the 
predictive validity of indirect attitude measures: Prediction of consumer choice 
behavior on the basis of affective priming in the picture-picture naming task. Journal 
of Experimental Social Psychology, 43, 599-610. 
Steffens, M. C. (2004). Is the Implicit Association Test immune to faking? Experimental 
Psychology, 51, 165-179. 
Steffens, M. C., Kirschbaum, M., & Glados, P. (2008). Avoiding stimulus confounds in 
Implicit Association Tests by using the concepts as stimuli. British Journal of Social 
Psychology, 47, 217-243. 
Steffens, M. C., Lichau, J., Still, Y., Jelenec, P., Anheuser, J., Goergens, N. K., et al. (2004). 
Individuum oder Gruppe, Exemplar oder Kategorie?: Ein Zweifaktorenmodell zur 
Erklärung der Reaktionszeitunterschiede im Implicit Association Test(IAT). 
Zeitschrift für Psychologie, 212, 57-65. 
Strack, F., & Deutsch, R. (2004). Reflective and impulsive determinants of social behavior. 
Personality & Social Psychology Review, 8, 220-247. 
Underwood, B. J. (1957). Interference and forgetting. Psychological Review, 64, 49-60. 
Walther, E. (2002). Guilty by mere association: Evaluative conditioning and the spreading 
attitude effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 919-934. 
Walther, E., Ebert, I., & Meinerling, K. (2009). Does cue competition reduce conditioned 
liking of brands and products? Manuscript under review. 
Wilson, T. D., Lindsey, S., & Schooler, T. Y. (2000). A model of dual attitudes. 
Psychological Review, 107, 101-126. 
Woodworth, R. S., & Schlosberg, H. (1954). Experimental psychology (Rev Ed.). Journal of 









i The debate whether implicit and explicit attitudes are distinct constructs has not yet been 
settled. When we use the term “implicit attitudes” we refer to automatic evaluative processes 
that tap associative rather than reflective bases of information processing. 






 Figure Caption 
 
Figure 1. Average error difference in the Response Window Priming task (priming effect) 
assessing attitudes towards Self compared to Others (Experiment 1), and attitudes towards 
Milka compared to Haribo (Experiment 2), separately for experimental conditions. Error bars 
reflect standard errors of means.  
Figure 2. Average reaction time difference (GNAT effects in milliseconds). GNATs assessing 
attitudes towards Self and Others in Experiment 1 (upper panel), and towards Milka and 
Haribo in Experiment 2 (lower panel), separately for experimental conditions. Error bars 
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